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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.980017-CA

v.
R. G. CHRISTENSEN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/ Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction of possession of an explosive
device, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995);
possession or use of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); possession or use of marijuana, a
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); and
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(a) (1998).* This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

Sections 76-10-306 and 58-37-8 were amended subsequent to this offense.
However, the amendments are irrelevant to this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10306 (Supp. 1997) and 58-37-8 (1998).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
This case presents the sole issue of whether the trial court correctly permitted one
of the State's witnesses to testify about (1) the explosive nature of the device found on
defendant, and (2) a "test" the witness conducted on the powder in the device, given the
fact that defendant had notice two months before trial that the witness would testify, and
the fact that the trial court excluded from trial any reference to testing the witness did
because defendant received no notice of it.
The decision to admit or exclude testimony for failure to adhere to discovery
obligations lies within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah App
1997). An abuse of discretion occurs where, after careful evaluation of all relevant
factors, the trial court's ruling is deemed to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained in or appended to this brief,
including:

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995);
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.

(Copies of these items are attached in addendum A.)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with four counts stemming from events
occurring on December 27, 1996, in Utah County: possession of an explosive device, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-306 (1995); possession or
use of methamphetamine in a drug free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); possession or use of marijuana, a class A
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998); and unlawful
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37a-5(a)(1998)(R. 1-2).
A trial was held on November 12, 1997, following which the jury convicted
defendant as charged (R. 81-85).2 The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms
of one-to-fifteen years at the Utah State Prison for each of the first two counts, and 1 year
for each of the third and fourth counts, suspended the sentences and placed defendant on
thirty-six months probation (R. 87-88). Defendant filed a timely appeal, challenging the
trial court's ruling on the motion he filed during the trial to exclude the testimony of one
of the State's witnesses.

defendant's appeal presents an issue related only to the conviction of possession
of an explosive device.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Alligator Park near Utah Lake in Provo, Utah, is a public facility that has an 11
p.m. curfew (R. 102/58). Officer Erik Knutzen was on routine patrol in the area at 3:14
a.m. on December 27, 1996, when he saw a red pick-up truck driving slowly through the
large parking lot in the dark (R. 102/58-59). The driver's window on the truck was down,
and the driver waived as the officer's car approached him (R. 102/59). The officer pulled
behind the truck, turned on his spotlight, and approached the driver's side of the truck (R.
102/59). He found defendant behind the wheel and his fourteen-year-old son in the front
passenger's seat (R. 102/69, 78).
Defendant handed the officer his driver's license with his left hand while holding
another object in his right hand (R. 102/59). That object was three inches long, XA inch in
diameter, and wrapped in aluminum foil with an eight-inch-long fuse protruding from one
end (R. 102/59-60, 89-90). The officer asked defendant what it was, and defendant
claimed that it was a "firecracker" (R. 102/60). The officer then asked if it was "a real
explosive device," to which defendant responded it was "a 30.06 shell with some
gunpowder inside of i f (R. 102/60).
The officer believed it to be a dangerous item and asked defendant to give it to him
(R. 102/60). When defendant did so, the officer was able to see inside the truck beyond
defendant and saw, in plain view between the front seats, three larger items, each
approximately one foot long, "a lot thicker" than the first device-nearing the size of "a
4

full stick of dynamiter-wrapped in aluminum foil, with a fuse sticking out of each (R.
102/61). The officer's previous experience with explosives had taught him that dynamite
is unstable and a homemade explosive is worse, so he immediately ordered defendant
away from the truck and called for backup (R. 102/61, 81, 90).
Within a few minutes, Officers Mark Jackson and Ann Richey arrived (R. 102/6162). Officer Knutzen told defendant he was under arrest, then had Officer Richey search
defendant for weapons while Knutzen searched the truck (R. 102/62, 70). Officer Richey
discovered an aspirin container in defendant's pants pocket in which she found a small
plastic baggie containing what defendant confirmed to be methamphetamine residue and
prescription drugs (R. 102/62-66, 85-86, 92-93).
In the meantime, Officer Knutzen searched the truck and found a velvet case under
the driver's seat containing a spoon with burn marks on it and a syringe, both of which
contained methamphetamine residue (R. 102/67-68). He also found a small baggie of
marijuana in the console between the front seats (R. 102/69). Elsewhere in the truck, he
found a bank bag, a bag of blasting caps with fuses, and a "shelf (R. 102/75. 106).
Officer Knutzen then requested that defendant be searched more thoroughly (R.
102/69-70). Officer Jackson conducted the second search of defendant and found a small
Polident tube in his coat pocket (R. 102/70, 98-99, 98-99). The tube was rolled up from
the bottom around a small plastic baggie (R. 102/70-72, 98-99). Defendant was asked if

5

the baggie contained methamphetamine, and he said, "Yes, I think so. I bought it with the
idea that it was meth." (R. 102/71-72, 100).
Having found what he believed to be explosives and blasting caps with fuses,
Officer Knutzen requested that Officer Brad Leatham be called (R. 102/74-75). As
commander of the bomb squad, Officer Leatham was required to respond and supervise
any investigation dealing with explosives (R. 102/103). Officer Leatham later
disassembled the item identified by defendant as a firecracker and found that it was in
fact a bullet casing WTapped in aluminum foil and containing smokeless powder with a
fuse tightly crimped both to the top of the shell and to blasting caps (R. 102/105-06, 11315, 124, 129).3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendant claims error in the trial court's admission of Officer Leatham's
testimony concerning the explosive nature of the device taken from defendant because the
prosecutor allegedly failed to give defendant the pre-trial notice required by Utah Code
Ann. § 77-17-13 (1995). His claim that the trial court should have granted a continuance

3

Officer Leatham apparently conducted a number of tests on the device (R.
102/143). However, the trial court granted defendant's motion to exclude any testimony
about the testing because defendant was "not given any opportunity to be present [at] or
to be aware" of the testing (R. 102/143). Nothing in the record on appeal sheds any light
on the number, type, or outcome of the testing. The officer's opinion at trial that the
device would explode and produce shrapnel was presented as being based solely on his
experience, expertise, and observations in matters wholly unrelated to this case. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that the opinion arose from specific testing of this device.
6

is not properly before this Court because defendant expressly told the trial court that he
did not want that relief His claim that he had no notice that Officer Leatham would give
his expert opinion at trial that the device would explode and would produce shrapnel is
without merit because he was aware from the preliminary hearing two months before trial
of the State's reliance on Officer Leatham's testimony and of the general content of that
testimony. Despite the prosecutor's failure to provide defendant with the officer's
curriculum vitae or a written report of his anticipated testimony, defendant had ample
opportunity prior to trial to enlist the trial court's help in obtaining additional information
he felt was necessary or to mitigate the anticipated prejudice from the testimony. His
failure to do so undermines his claim of surprise and prejudice. Moreover, even assuming
error occurred, it was harmless given the remaining unchallenged testimony about the
components of the device, the dangerous nature of the blasting caps, the way the
components were put together, and the officer's experience with numerous similar
devices in the past.
Further, any error in the admission of testimony that Officer Leatham lighted the
powder in the device to verify his initial determination that it was smokeless gunpowder
was harmless where the testimony added little, if anything, to the case given the fact that
the officer testified that he had already unquestionably identified the powder before
conducting the simple verification.

7

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EXPERT TESTIMONY
WHERE DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE PRE-TRIAL NOTICE TO MEET
THE TESTIMONY OR TO MITIGATE ANY PREJUDICE ARISING
THEREFROM BUT DID NEITHER; ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR IN
ADMISSION OF THE TESTIMONY WAS HARMLESS
Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed Officer Brad
Leatham to testify as an expert witness on behalf of the State. Specifically, he claims that
some of Leatham*s testimony should have been excluded because of the State's alleged
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(a)(1) (1995), which requires that the prosecutor
provide pre-trial notice to defendant of any expert testimony he will offer at trial. Br. of
Aplt. at 8-10. Further, he claims that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a
continuance to meet the testimony. Id. at 2, 7. However, defendant's claim of error fails
on both counts.
A.

Standard of Appellate Review and Trial Court Ruling:
The decision of whether to bar testimony for a party's failure to adhere to

discovery obligations is within the broad discretion of the trial court, and an appellate
court reviews the decision for a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Begishe, 937 P.2d 527,
529-30 (Utah App. 1997) (noting also that in the absence of much judicial interpretation
of section 77-17-13, an appellate court should look to cases involving prosecutorial
violations of discovery responsibilities under rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure).
8

An abuse of discretion occurs when, after careful evaluation of all relevant factors, the
denial can be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. Id at 530; see also United States v.
Flvnt 756 F.2d 1352, 1358, opinion amended bv 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985).
The parties initially addressed this matter below in an unrecorded bench
conference the day of trial (R. 102/41, 102). Defendant made a record of his objection
after Officer Brad Leatham completed his testimony and the jury had been excused (R.
102/139-44) (a copy of the argument is attached as addendum B). The trial court opened
the discussion by noting that it had previously heard the objection, had denied defendant's
motion, and "would allow the witness to testify" (R. 102/139). Add. B. Following
argument, the court elaborated that it had earlier granted defendant's motion, in part, by
excluding from trial any testimony involving "[a]ny tests which the witness may have
conducted relative to this particular device" because defendant was "not given any
opportunity to be present or to be aware" (R. 102/143) (a copy of the trial court's ruling
is included in addendum B). The court elaborated:
Well, as indicated, counsel, the Court is of the opinion the statute [§ 77-1713] is intended to give notice. The fact that the witness had previously testified
without objection certainly gives indication that you were aware of the testimony
of the witness.
(R. 102/143).4 Add. B.

4

The trial court had some concern that Officer Leatham in fact testified as an
expert. Although the court assumed, for purposes of defendant's motion, that expert
testimony was involved, it voiced its believe that the testimony was based on experience
9

B.

This Court Need Not Address Defendant's Claim Of Error In The Denial Of A
Continuance As Defendant Expressly Denied Seeking Such Relief Below:
Any claim that the trial court denied defendant's request for a continuance is not

properly before this Court because defendant failed to request such relief below. See
State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989) (failure to request a continuance
essentially waives the right to later claim error in the trial court's ruling on a discovery
issue); State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988) (failure to make timely efforts to
mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused by the discovery violation waives the right to
relief). First, defense counsel told the court below, "We're not asking for a continuance
of the trial. We're asking that this witness be precluded from testifying because we didn't
receive notice." (R. 102/142-43). Add. B. Second, despite the fact that defendant knew
at least two months prior to trial not only that Officer Leatham would likely testify at trial
but also the basic substance of the testimony (R. 102/142-43), defendant took no steps to
inform the Court of the prosecutor's failure to identify his trial witnesses or to require the
Court to order the release of the officer's curriculum vitae or a summary of his testimony.
Instead, defendant waited until the day of trial and sought only exclusion of the witness'
testimony. Defendant's failure to take available, less drastic steps to mitigate any
prejudice in the face of his reasonable knowledge of the testimony prevents him from
obtaining the requested relief on appeal. See Griffiths. 752 P.2d at 883; State v.

"which almost any police officer or other person might well have" (R. 102/144). Add. B.
10

Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 948 (Utah App. 1990) (failure to ask for any but the
harshest of remedies when faced with unexpected evidence precludes a claim of error on
appeal); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) ("[A] party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error/'). Accordingly, this Court need not address this claim.
£.

Alternatively, The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Permitting The
Officer To Testify As An Expert:
Section 77-17-13 provides:
(l)(a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify in a
felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing, the party
intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing party as soon as
practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten days before the hearing.
Notice shall include the name and address of the expert, the expert's curriculum
vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately
inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony including any
opinion and the bases and reasons of that opinion, the party intending to call the
expert shall provide to the opposing party a written explanation of the expert's
anticipated testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the
expert when available.

Add. A.
Defendant contends that because he never received written notice that Officer
Leatham would testify or any of the other written information referenced by the statute,

11

Officer Leatham should not have been permitted to testify that the device found in
defendant's hand would explode and produce shrapnel. Br. of Aplt. at 8, 10.
Nothing in the statute requires that the entirety of the notice be given in writing.
The prosecutor in fact provided notice of Officer Leatham's status as an expert and the
expected substance of his anticipated testimony when he had Officer Leatham testify at
the preliminary hearing two months before trial. The only witnesses at that hearing were
Officer Leatham and the arresting officer (R. 11). Although the prosecutor should have
followed up with the written material referenced in the statute, his failure to do so under
the facts at hand does not warrant reversal. The giving of notice two months prior to trial
necessarily comports with the statute's requirement that notice must be given u as soon as
practicable" but at least thirty days before trial. In this case, defendant cannot claim
surprise from the officer's trial testimony because he received notice which included both
the existence and the content of Officer Leatham's testimony (R. 102/142). Officer
Leatham testified, without objection, at the preliminary hearing, and his testimony
included roughly the same information elicited from him at trial (R. 102/142).D
Consequently, defendant was on reasonable notice that Officer Leatham not only would

5

Defendant did not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing as part of the
record on appeal. Accordingly, this Court must assume the regularity of the proceeding
and that it conformed to the undisputed representations about it made on the record
below. See Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 946-47 ( u; When crucial matters are not included
in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.'")
(quoting State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985)).
12

testify at trial, but, as an explosives officer, would testify about the explosive nature of the
device in defendant's possession consistently with his preliminary hearing testimony. To
assume anything less would be unreasonable.
Neither was the defendant robbed of the opportunity to have an expert testify as to
the non-explosive nature of the device. Defendant knew from the time the charges were
filed that the explosiveness of the device he possessed would be at issue, and he knew the
basic content of the officer's testimony as of the preliminary hearing. This gave him
ample time to investigate the defense theory that the item did not qualify as an explosive.
His failure to do so should not be laid at the prosecutor's feet merely because a written
report or curriculum vitae was not provided to defendant.
Despite the advance notice, nothing suggests that defendant ever took steps to
compel the prosecutor to reveal any additional information, either by direct contact with
the prosecutor or by resort to the trial court over the next two months. Instead, he waited
until trial, then sought to have the witness' testimony excluded.

Defense counsel "has

an affirmative duty to make a reasonable investigation^]" State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138,
143 (Utah 1994), and he had sufficient information and ample time within which to
investigate the explosive nature of the device prior to trial or to seek whatever additional
information he felt he needed. His failure to timely act does not warrant a determination
that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to exclude from trial Officer
Leatham's testimony about the explosiveness of the device.
13

Defendant relies on two cases to argue that reversal is warranted under these
circumstances. However, both are distinguishable from the facts at hand. Defendant cites
State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138 (Utah 1994), as authority for excluding the expert testimony
and the act of lighting the powder based on a violation of section 77-17-13. Br. of Aplt.
at 6, 9. However, Kallin never mentions section 77-17-13. Instead, the opinion
references only the trial court's pre-trial order directing disclosure of the parties' expert
witnesses and the content of their testimony. Id at 142. Moreover, not only did
defendant in Kallin fail to disclose to the prosecutor that the proposed expert would say
that defendant was not a pedophile, but questioning of the expert outside the jury's
presence suggested that the expert was not prepared to give that testimony. Id at 141-2 &
n.4.
Defendant also relies on State v. Begishe. 937 P.2d 527 (Utah App. 1997), as
authority for his claim that a continuance or exclusion of the testimony was warranted. In
Begishe, this Court held that the trial court erroneously denied defendant's request to
exclude expert testimony and related test results or to continue the proceedings to permit
defendant to meet the evidence where the prosecutor had not provided the notice required
by section 77-17-13(l)(a). Id at 531-32. However, Begishe differs from the case at hand
on three points. First, unlike defendant herein, defense counsel in Begishe sought a
continuance in the trial court, thereby providing a basis for the appellate court's holding
that the trial court "at a minimum was required to grant a continuance of reasonable
14

duration.v Id. at 532. Second, counsel in Begishe also verified the day before trial her
belief that no additional testing had been done; defense counsel in this case made no such
effort. Id. at 528. Third, the appellate court expressly recognized that the prosecutor's
violation in Begishe was "uniquely egregious": the prosecutor unjustifiably waited until
noon on the first day of trial to send certain evidence to the state crime lab for testing,
with the result that defense counsel began trial with the reassurance she received from the
state crime lab the day before trial that no testing beyond that already known to counsel
had been done. Id. at 528-29. The prosecutor's delayed action led defense counsel to
believe that there was no physical evidence corroborating the charges against defendant.
Id. at 530. In contrast, defense counsel in this case had two months notice as to the fact
and content of Officer Leathanf s testimony, and he successfully excluded from trial
evidence of the officer's testing of the device.
Given these significant differences, neither Kallin nor Begishe are persuasive
authority.
Consequently, neither case is controlling authority given the circumstances in this
case.
P.

Reversal Is Not Warranted Where Defendant Suffered No Prejudice From The
Absence Of A Curriculum Vitae Or Written Report Of Officer Leathanf s
Testimony:
Even assuming, arguendo, that error occurred in the trial court's admission of

Officer Leatham's testimony, reversal is not warranted because the admission of the
15

testimony amounted to no more than harmless error. "An error is harmful if, 'absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome' for the defendant, or
'our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 728 (Utah
App. 1997) (quoting Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09).
Defendant complains that he had no reason to know that Officer Leatham would
give expert testimony that the device could explode, and that he had no time to meet the
testimony with his own expert. Br. of Aplt. at 7-10. However, he knew as of two months
prior to trial that the State would rely in large part on Officer Leatham's testimony and
what the basic content of that testimony was going to be. See point IC, supra.
Defendant's assertion that he could have found an expert to say that the device "would in
fact not explode" is made without any support, and is extremely doubtful in light of the
fact that the explosive nature of the device is a necessary element of one of the charges,
and use of such testimony would have been in defendant's best interest even absent the
challenged testimony from Officer Leatham. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10. However, defendant
failed to advance such testimony below.
Moreover, even without the challenged expert opinion that the device in
defendant's control would explode and that the metal casing would produce shrapnel,
there was sufficient evidence to establish the explosive nature of the device to support the
jury's verdict on the charge of possession of an explosive device, rendering it unlikely
that the outcome would have been more favorable for defendant. There were four devices
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found in defendant's truck: one in his hand, three more between the driver and the
passenger seats (R. 120/59-60). Defendant was holding what he called a "firecracker,"
and he described it to the arresting officer as being "a 30.06 shell with some gunpowder
inside of it" (R. 102/60). Officer Leatham testified that the device consisted of a metal
casing (a bullet) containing smokeless powder wrapped in aluminum foil with a neck
tightly crimped on a fuse which in turn was crimped to blasting caps (R. 102/105-06, 11415, 124, 129). Other testimony established that the powder found in firecrackers was
different than the powder found in this device (R. 102/90). Officer Leatham testified that
he had seen similar devices in the past explode numerous times (R. 102/128-30). He said
that it is the blasting caps that cause the explosion, and that the caps used in this case
were "extremely forceful and hazardous" and could go off if dropped and stomped on (R.
102/107-09, 122). He noted that the blasting cap alone is probably more than three times
as volatile as a firecracker (R. 121-22), and that any one of the blasting caps taken from
defendant's car could take someone's hand apart, cause serious physical injury or death,
and blow a coffee can ten or fifteen feet into the air, making a sieve of the can (R. 107,
121-22, 136). This evidence amply supports a determination that defendant's device was
explosive and renders it highly unlikely that defendant would have had a more favorable
result absent the express testimony that the device was in fact explosive and would
produce shrapnel. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted.
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E.

Any Error In Admitting Testimony That The Officer Lit Some Of The Powder In
The Device To Verify His Conclusion As To The Type Of Powder Was Harmless:
Defendant appears to fault the trial court's ruling on testing done by Officer

Leatham, suggesting that he was prejudiced by admission of testimony about one such
test because the untimely notice of the tests given on the first day of trial rendered him
unable to obtain his own expert to participate in or conduct separate tests. Br. of Aplt. at
11.
The trial court excluded from trial any testimony from Officer Leatham involving
*'[a]ny tests which the witness may have conducted relative to this particular device"
because defendant was "not given any opportunity to be present or to be aware" (R.
102/143). Add. B. Defendant appears to claim on appeal what he claimed below: that
Officer Leatham's testimony at trial about lighting the powder found in the device
constituted inadmissible "testing" testimony (R. 102/144).6 The officer made no other
mention in his testimony below of testing done in regard to the device at issue.7

6

The trial judge erroneously responded that he believed that some of that testimony
was the result of defense questioning (R. 102/144). Add. B. However, the testimony
came out during the prosecutor's direct examination of the witness, and defendant
unsuccessfully objected to it (R. 102/115).
7

Defendant does not claim that the officer's opinion that the device would explode
constituted inadmissible "testing" testimony. The officer's opinion was based on his
experience, training and observations of other testing conducted in unrelated matters prior
to this case. Defendant's apparent claim concerning admission of testing evidence relates
solely to the lighting of the powder inside the device for verification purposes.
18

Officer Leatham testified that when he took the device apart, he found smokeless
powder, and that "[t]here was no question in my mind that it was smokeless powder" (R.
102/115). He thereafter verified his finding of the type of powder by lighting a small part
of it to see how, not if, it burned (R. 102/115). This Court need not determine whether
admission of the testimony constituted error because assuming, arguendo, that error
occurred, it was harmless. State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 411 (Utah 1993) (where a
claimed error is harmless, the appellate court need not determine whether error in
fact occurred).
The officer testified that by lighting the powder, he merely verified what he had
already conclusively found—the powder in the device was a smokeless powder (R.
102/115). Where the officer had already stated, without objection, his absolute certainty
that the device contained smokeless powder, he based that determination on his
experience and observations, and that determination supported the remainder of his
testimony, it is highly unlikely that without mention of the fact that he lit the powder for
verification, the jury would have rendered a verdict more favorable to defendant. Perez,
946 P.2d at 728. The mere absence of this single act of verification is not reasonably
likely to undermine the credibility of the witness to the point that the jury would have
rejected his findings. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ifr

day of July, 1998.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

^ 7 ^
KRIS C. LEONARD
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

76-10-306. Definitions — Persons exempted — Penalties
for possession, use, or removal of explosives,
chemical, or incendiary devices and possession
of components.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" means:
(i) dynamite and all other forms of high explosives, including water
gel, slurry, military C-4 (plastic explosives), blasting agents to include
nitro-carbon-nitrate, ammonium nitrate, fuel oil mixtures, cast primers and boosters, R.D.X., P.E.T.N., electric and nonelectric blasting
caps, exploding cords commonly called detonating cord, detcord, or
primacord, picric acid explosives, T.N.T. and T.N.T. mixtures, nitroglycerin and nitroglycerin mixtures, or any other chemical mixture
intended to explode with fire or force;
(ii) any explosive bomb, grenade, missile, or similar device; and
(iii) any incendiary bomb, grenade, fire bomb, chemical bomb, or
similar device, including any device, except kerosene lamps, if criminal intent has not been established, which consists of or includes a
breakable container including a flammable liquid or compound and a
wick composed of any material which, when ignited, is capable of
igniting the flammable liquid or compound or any breakable container
which consists of, or includes a chemical mixture that explodes with
fire or force and can be carried, thrown, or placed.
(b) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" shall not include rifle,
pistol, or shotgun ammunition.
(c) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" means any substances or
materials or combinations which have been prepared or altered for use in
the creation of an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device. These substances or materials include:
(i) timing device, clock, or watch which has been altered in such a
manner as to be used as the arming device in an explosive;
(ii) pipe, end caps, or metal tubing which has been prepared for a
pipe bomb; and
(iii) mechanical timers, mechanical triggers, chemical time delays,
electronic time delays, or commercially made or improvised items
which, when used singly or in combination, may be used in the
construction of a timing delay mechanism, booby trap, or activating
mechanism for any explosive, chemical, or incendiary device.
(d) "Explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts" shall not include rifle,
pistol, or shotgun ammunition, or any signaling device customarily used in
operation of railroad equipment.
(2) The provisions in Subsections (3) and (6) shall not apply to:
(a) any public safety officer while acting in his official capacity transporting or otherwise handling explosives, chemical, or incendiary devices;
(b) any member of the armed forces of the United States or Utah
National Guard while acting in his official capacity;
(c) any person possessing a valid permit issued under the provisions of
Uniform Fire Code, Article 77, or any employee of such permittee acting
within the scope of his employment;
(d) any person possessing a valid license as an importer, wholesaler, or
display operator under the provisions of the Utah Fireworks Act, Sections
11-3-3.2 and 11-3-3.5; and
(e) any person or entity possessing or controlling an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device as part of its lawful business operations.
(3) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses or
controls an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device is guilty of a felony of the
second degree.
(4) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly:
(a) uses or causes to be used an explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device in the commission of or an attempt to commit a felony; or
(b) injures another or attempts to injure another in his person or
property through the use of an explosive, chemical, or incendiary device, is
guilty of a felony of the first degree.
(5) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly removes or
causes to be removed or carries away any explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device from the premises where said explosive, chemical, or incendiary device
is kept by the lawful user, vendor, transporter, or manufacturer without the
consent or direction of the lawful possessor is guilty of a felony of the second
degree.
(6) Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesses any
explosive, chemical, or incendiary parts is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
History: C. 1953,76-10-306, enacted by L. present section, effective May 3, 1993.
1993, ch. 75, S 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Section 11-3-3.2, cited
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws in Subsection (2Xd), was renumbered in 1993
1993, ch. 75, $ 1 repeals former $ 76-10-306, as *, $ 53-7-223 to be part of the Fire Prevention
enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, $ 76-10-306, a n ( j Fireworks Act.
defining "infernal machine," and enacts the
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77-17-13

77-17-13. Expert testimony generally — Notice requirements.
(1) (a) If the prosecution or the defense intends to call any expert to testify
in a felony case at trial or any hearing, excluding a preliminary hearing,
the party intending to call the expert shall give notice to the opposing
party as soon as practicable but not less than 30 days before trial or ten
days before the hearing. Notice shall include the name and address of the
expert, the expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report.
(b) The expert shall prepare a written report relating to the proposed
testimony. If the expert has not prepared a report or the report does not
adequately inform concerning the substance of the expert's proposed
testimony including any opinion and the bases and reasons of that
opinion, the party intending to call the expert shall provide to the opposing
party a written explanation of the expert's anticipated testimony sufficient
to give the opposing party adequate notice to prepare to meet the
testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by the expert when
available.
(2) As soon as practicable after receipt of the expert's report, the party
receiving notice shall provide notice to the other party of witnesses whom the
party anticipates calling to rebut the expert's testimony, including the name
and address of any expert witness and the expert's curriculum vitae. If
available, a report of any rebuttal expert shall be provided. If the rebuttal
expert has not prepared a report or the report does not adequately inform
concerning the substance of the expert's proposed testimony, or in the event the
rebuttal witness is not an expert, the party intending to call the rebuttal
witness shall provide a written explanation of the witness's anticipated
rebuttal testimony sufficient to give the opposing party adequate notice to
prepare to meet the testimony, followed by a copy of any report prepared by any
rebuttal expert when available.
(3) If the defendant or the prosecution fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the opposing party shall be entitled to a continuance of the trial or
hearing sufficient to allow preparation to meet the testimony. If the court finds
that the failure to comply with this section is the result of bad faith on the part
of any party or attorney, the court shall impose appropriate sanctions.
History: C. 1953, 77-17-13, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 139, § 3.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 139

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
(0 Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and
other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of
the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the
foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance
shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear
or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for
consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused
and shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem
appropriate.
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MR. GALE:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Very well.

Thank you for coming

You f ll be excused.
We're going to recess now for lunch, and
we'll reconvene at 1:30.

We have a few matters to

take care of now.
And during the time of recess do not discuss
the case among yourselves, nor permit anyone else to
discuss the case with you.

Have no conversations on

any topic with the attorneys, parties, or witnesses.
And we'll be in recess until 1:30.
(The following proceedings were
held in open court after the jury
left the courtroom:)
THE COURT:

Okay, counsel, the Court had

previously heard your argument relative to allowing
this particular witness to testify and advised you
that I was denying your motion and would allow the
witness to testify and have told you you can preserve
for the record your objection until this time.

So go

ahead.
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:

Judge, if I may -You can be seated.

I'm sorry.

I meant them, not you, counsel.
MR. GALE:

If I may, Judge, I would just be
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objecting on a few grounds.

First, that Utah Code of

Criminal Procedure 77-17-13 requires that the
prosecution give us 30 days notice prior to calling an
expert, that they present us with a curriculum vitae
of the expert, and also that they give us a copy of
the expert's report.
And so we would be objecting that we did not
receive any of this from the prosecution.

In fact,

the prosecution was ordered last week at the pretrial
to provide a witness list.
witness list.

We never received a

They indicated that they felt like they

gave us notice at the preliminary hearing by calling
this witness at the preliminary hearing.

However, I

believe that the statute indicates that they should
give us notice 30 days before trial or ten days before
any hearing.

And so I would think that that

anticipates notice before a preliminary hearing, also
notice before a trial.
Also, in the case of State vs. Calin, the
State was aware that the defense was going to call an
expert, similar to this case, that the defense failed
to give the proper notice in compliance with the
statute.

Because they didn't comply with the statute,

the defense was precluded from calling that expert.
And we would think that the prosecution needs to be
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held to the same standard.
The State had the opportunity to give notice.
The State knew that they were going to call this
person at the time of the prelim.

They knew last

week, and they didn't actually give us notice until -we didn't actually know until today that he was going
to be an expert witness.

And also they indicated to

us today that he conducted tests, and we were not
given any notice of those tests or any opportunity to
participate or observe.
If we would have had the opportunity, then we
would have called our own expert, had our own expert
examine the items and be able to bring our own
testimony in as to the force or as to the explosive
nature of these devices.
And we think because notice wasn't given to
us, that we didn't have an opportunity to observe, to
examine his curriculum vitae, to examine any report
prepared by him, that our client has been denied due
process, and that the State has not complied with the
rules, and that our client has been prejudiced because
of this, and that expert testimony given by this
person -- that we were not able to refute that because
of the State's failure to give us notice.
THE COURT:

Mr. Jube.
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MR. JUBE:

Just initially in my own defense,

frankly, I didn't know about this case until about 10
days ago.

So with regard to the notice of expert, I'm

coming in a little bit late in the game.

However, the

irony of defense's argument is that they claim the
State knew as soon as a week or more ago that they
were going to call this witness.
is so did the defense.
hearing.

The bottom line fact

He testified at preliminary

And to say -- he testified at the

preliminary hearing and testified about these kinds of
things.

And then now to say they didn't have notice

that we were going to call him and ask him to testify
about these kinds of things, doesn't make any sense.
I mean, the statute is designed to make sure
no one is blind-sided with expert testimony that they
don't even know might be a possibility.

In this case,

it wasn't just a possibility, it had already been done
once at the prelim.
I think under the circumstances to ask for a
continuance of the trial and delay this even further
is unwarranted.

It's unnecessary and judicially

inefficient.
MR. GALE:
asking for.
trial.

And, Judge, that's not what we're

We're not asking for a continuance of the

We're asking that this witness be precluded
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from testifying because we didn't receive notice.
And, Judge, the statute isn't just to help us
not get blind-sided.

The statute is to -- it requires

that we get notice so that we can be provided with an
opportunity to find out his credentials, find out
exactly what tests he's done, and find out exactly
what his testimony is going to be.

It's not just to

give us notice just saying, "We're calling an expert."
It's to give us information so that we can determine
whether we need to call our own expert.

That was not

done in this case.
THE COURT:

Well, as indicated, counsel, the

Court is of the opinion the statute is intended to
give notice.

The fact that the witness had previously

testified without objection certainly gives indication
that you were aware of the testimony of the witness.
Any tests which the witness may have
conducted relative to this particular device, the
Court excluded from testifying thereto because you
were not given any opportunity to be present or to be
aware.
But as to his testimony, candidly, I'm not
sure how much is expertise.
is.

The Court is assuming it

As indicated, I've found that notice has been

given as a practical matter.

But the Court is of the
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opinion that the testimony given is that of a person
through experience which almost any police officer or
other person might well have.

And, therefore, as an

expert, it f s a pretty low-level expertise.
MR. GALE:
THE COURT:
MR. GALE:

Judge -I've made my ruling,
Just briefly, Judge.

I'd just

like to note that it wasn't excluded -- the
information that he like tested this powder, the
powder from this particular device, to make sure it
was flammable, he actually did testify that he did
perform that test.
THE COURT:

And the Court allowed that.
I think some of those questions

were a result of your questions, counsel.
All right.

We're going to be in recess until

1:30.
(Lunch recess taken.)
(The following proceedings were
held in open court in the presence
of the jury:)
THE COURT:

Be seated, please.

may show that the jury is all present.

The record
Counsel for

the State and counsel for the defendant and defendant
are present.
You may call your next witness.
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